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Abstract—
 
Text-based passwords, despite their well-known 
drawbacks, remain the dominant user authentication scheme 
implemented. Graphical password systems, based on visual 
information such as the recognition of photographs and / 
or pictures, have emerged as a promising alternative to the 
aggregate reliance on text passwords. Nevertheless, despite the 
advantages offered they have not been widely used in practice 
since many open issues need to be resolved. In this paper we 
propose a novel graphical password scheme, NAVI, where 
the credentials of the user are his username and a password 
formulated by drawing a route on a predefined map. We 
analyze the strength of the password generated by this scheme 
and present a prototype implementation in order to illustrate 
the feasibility of our proposal. Finally, we discuss NAVI’s 
security features and compare it with existing graphical 
password schemes as well as text-based passwords in terms of 
key security features, such aspassword keyspace, dictionary 
attacks and guessing attacks. The proposed scheme appears 
to have the same or better performance in the majority of the 
security features examined.
Keywords-component; graphical passwords; knowledge-
based authentication;
I.  INTRODUCTION
In challenge response authentication schemes the 
authenticator poses a question – a challenge- and the user 
has to provide a correct answer – a response- in order to 
be authenticated. The simplest challenge-response case 
is when the user is challenged to provide his password, 
while in other cases certain mathematical operations 
may be performed, such as hash functions, which utilize 
the shared secret, e.g. the message authentication code. 
In most case, though, when one refers to authentication 
based on something the user knows, we usually refer to 
passwords or PINs are implied. The inherent weakness of 
the aforementioned schemes is rather obvious: the human 
limitation to remember long random strings of characters 
that would formulate a strong password.
Intense research work has taken place in order to 
evaluate and improve password schemes. Nevertheless,   
weak passwords are very often chosen by users, which are 
subsequently taken into advantage by malicious attackers to 
gain unauthorized access to information systems. Graphical 
passwords provide a promising alternative to the traditional 
text-based password authentication. The key concept is the 
human ability to recognize or recall images more easily than 
textual information [1]. Text-based passwords remain the 
dominant authentication scheme due to their ease of use, 
inexpensive deployment, user familiarity and acceptance 
contrary to the more demanding requirements of other 
authentication schemes, like the costs involved in token-
based authentication, privacy and user acceptance issues in 
biometrics, etc.
A successful security mechanism has to be both usable 
and secure. A security mechanism that is not user-friendly 
is inherently insecure, since users will systematically try 
to misuse it or bypass it altogether. Graphical passwords 
have to address a critical challenge: the balance between 
the security of the produced graphical password and 
the user friendliness and acceptance.  In this paper, we 
present a novel graphical password scheme, namely Novel 
Authentication with Visual Information (NAVI), which 
is meant to be a graphical password scheme that is easy 
to implement and user-friendly while providing a high 
level of assurance in terms of password strength. Our goal 
was to develop a scheme that produces passwords from a 
adequately large keyspace, where the password keyspace 
is defined as the set of different possible values a password 
can take, and that relies on existing widely-used services 
that are easy to use and familiar to end users. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In 
section 2 we provide an overview of some related work, 
while in section 3 the proposed scheme is described. A 
security discussion follows in section 4, where issues 
regarding the strength of both text-based and graphical 
passwords are briefly analyzed and a comparison of the 
aforementioned schemes is provided. Finally, in section 6 a 
proof of concept implementation is presented and section 7 
provides conclusions and directions for  future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Graphical passwords were first introduced by G. 
Blonder in 1996 [2]. Since then, a variety of graphical 
authentication schemes have been proposed and 
implemented and some commercial products have been 
launched. Nevertheless, none of them has been widely 
adopted or can be considered practical to use and secure at 
the same time. 
Graphical passwords are usually formulated by a user 
by selecting a set of images in a specific order or drawing.  
In the context of this paper the term graphical passwords 
will be used in the broadest possible sense to include every 
password scheme that authenticates users based on visual 
information,  including the selections of images, the clicking 
or dragging on images, drawing etc.
One way to categorize graphical password systems is to 
separate them in two broad categories: 
 
• recognition-based , and
• recall-based. 
In a recognition-based authentication scheme, the user 
is presented with a set of images and he is then requested to 
recognize the set of images he originally had selected as his 
password at the registration stage.
Passfaces [3] is a commercial product where the user 
authenticates himself by selecting from a grid of nine faces 
a previously seen human face. The process is repeated until 
all previously (typically three to seven) seen faces have 
been identified. In Awase [4] a user uploads a picture of 
his choice, and, then, he is requested to recognize it among 
a number of decoy images. “Use your Illusion” [5] has a 
similar approach but also takes into account the difficulties 
that may be encountered when using a low resolution device 
and pictureshave been blurred in a controlled manner. 
In “Déjà vu” [6] users are requested to select 5 pictures 
from a set of 25 images in order to create their graphical 
password. At the same time the users are requested to create 
a traditional password. 
Sobrado and Birget [7] suggested a number of graphical 
passwords schemes that are resistant to shoulder surfing 
attacks. The user selects 3 images from a large set. In order 
to be authenticated the user needs to select a point in the 
triangle the 3 images formulate. Asghar et al. [8]  presented 
a cryptanalysis attack that greatly undermines the overall 
security of this scheme. 
In recall-based authentication schemes, a single picture 
is displayed to the user, who in turn selects / clicks / drags / 
draws one or more locations on the picture to initialize his 
password at the registration stage. At the log in phase, the 
user will be requested to reproduce these operations. Since 
it is expected that the users will be unable to reproduce their 
drawings with complete accuracy, an error threshold must 
be set.
A commercial product designed specifically for 
mobile devices is SFR Password, where the user enters the 
previously defined spots in the correct order to unlock the 
mobile device [9]. Input precision is a problem with this 
technique, which limits the possible password keyspace if 
the tolerance is high and may be impractical if the tolerance 
is too low. 
In Passpoints [10] the user credentials are a sequence 
of clicks in positions in given image positions. Image 
processing techniques, a biased selection from users and 
other attacks have been demonstrated against such a system 
that undermine its security and render it effectively broken 
[11], [12]. 
In Draw A Secret (DAS), introduced by Jermyn et al. 
[13], the user has to draw something in a two dimensional 
grid. The coordinates of the grids are used to formulate the 
password. DAS offers an adequate keyspace. 
Three dimensional objects and the environment can also 
be utilized to formulate a password scheme [14], [15]. The 
sequence of actions and the interactions with objects in this 
environment formulate the 3-D password. 3-D passwords 
are considered a multifactor authentication scheme that 
encompasses graphical passwords. 
For a more comprehensive overview of existing 
literature and a further analysis of the usability and security 
issues of graphical passwords, surveys are available in 
Dunphy et al. [16], Biddle et al. [17], Renaud [18], Hagiz et 
al. [19], Monrose et al. [20] and Suo et al. [21].
III. NOVEL GRAPHICAL PASSWORD SCHEME
A. Overview of NAVI Authentication Scheme
In this paper, we introduce a novel knowledge-based 
authentication scheme that belongs to the recall-based 
graphical passwords family. The credentials of the user are 
a route (or multiple routes) of his choice. For simplicity, we 
will only discuss the case where a single route is required 
for authentication. 
The route is designed in a predetermined map. The 
user selects the starting and the ending point and the 
route is calculated by the provider of the route planning 
service. Further details with regards to the specifics of the 
route selection are discussed in the section that follows. 
Furthermore tin order to highlight the feasibility of the 
authentication mechanisms proposed, a case study with a 
prototype implementation of the proposed scheme based 
on the Google mapsTM mapping service will be presented 
(Figure 1).
Note that in principle our scheme can be implemented 
in any other platform that supports maps and allows users 
to plan routes. Being based on Google maps provides 
flexibility ease of use and user acceptance, since Google 
maps is a widely-used service and there is a large pool of 
users already accustomed to it. Assuming a Google map 
approach. the routes will be two dimensional (Google maps 
utilize a variation of the Mercator projection, a widely-used 
method for maps projection that takes its name from its 
inventor Gerardus Mercator, a Flemish mapmaker who lived 
in the 15th century).
The user is challenged to choose a username and a 
route of his choice the first time he logs into the system 
(the equivalent of setting the password). This pair will be 
called “route password” from now on. Whenever the user 
wishes to log in, he is challenged to recreate the route he has 
chosen as the route password. If the route matches the route 
password the user is successfully authenticated and he is 
allowed to log in.
 
 
Figure 1. Route in Google maps.
 
B. Requirements for a Secure Route 
Since a route is something the user knows, it may 
be subject to attacks similar to those in other recall-
based schemes. A set of criteria are proposed in order to 
strengthen the route password, the equivalent of setting up a 
strong password. As such, the route must be unpredictable, 
so that the starting and ending points as well as the 
intermediate route cannot be guessed. Furthermore, the 
route should be long enough in order to include many turns 
in order to provide adequate complexity. It is also necessary 
that the user does not use the predefined route suggested 
but he modifies it by introducing at least one deviation from 
the route created by Google maps. To be more specific the 
following user guidelines can be provided:
• The starting and ending points must be 
unpredictable, e.g. they should not include home or 
work addresses, and locations like a user’s gym and 
the like  should be avoided.
• The route must include a minimum of 4 turns (in 
other words the route must consist of at least 6 
points).
• At least one deviation from the automatically 
calculated route must be introduced.
• At least one route should be located in a country 
different than the home country of the user.
It is important to take into account that the first 
requirement cannot be strictly enforced, since it relies upon 
the user, and there is no generic way to confirm that the 
user has not used, for example, his home location as the end 
point of his route, just like no system can ensure that the 
user has not used his license plate as part of his password. 
On the contrary, the remaining requirements can be strictly 
enforced by the authentication system and they can be 
parameterized, if needed, by the system administrator and 
the security policy applicable to the particular system / 
application. 
We shall shortly illustrate that the strength of the 
produced secret mainly relies on the number of “turns” and 
their unpredictability. The other parameters are useful in 
order to counter attacks that are based on the knowledge of 
information regarding the user.  
IV. ENCODING THE ROUTE PASSWORD
It not straightforward what will be the exact string of 
characters that the system will require for authentication. 
We will discuss two approaches with some variations 
and their corresponding features. Namely, the following 
solutions will be examined:
• using the coordinates with a minimum of 
processing, and
• approximate the route with a polynomial.
A. Minimum Processing 
In Google maps every turn, which is equivalent 
to a point, is represented with a pair of numbers e.g. 
(51.50364050493053, -0.135955810546875). From the 16 
digits of each coordinate we will take into account only 
the decimal numbers, and exclude the integer values. The 
reason for that is that the integer values can be subject 
to guessing attacks. The range of the decimal values are 
limited by the fact that a significant set of them corresponds 
to uninhabited areas where it would be impossible for a 
user to plan a route,  e.g. in oceans, mountains etc. We also 
exclude the first two decimals as they provide poor entropy, 
since unless the user chooses a very long route these digits 
will remain constant and even if they increase or decrease, 
this value it will be one. Furthermore, since the first two 
digits define a large geographical area it is expected that 
they will be susceptible to guessing attacks. The remaining 
12 digits can be used to formulate the secret. 
For every turn included in the route, 24 digits of “secret” 
can be produced. In order to deal with guessing attacks it 
would be preferable to perform a one way “function”, i.e. 
perform an XOR (logical AND) in order to  increase the 
resistance to attacks but this will result in limiting the size 
of the secret to 12 decimal digits per turn. Assuming that 
the route includes 4 turns, our secret can be composed of 
4*12=48 digits. The password keyspace of the produced 
secret will be 1048 ≈ 2160.
If no processing takes place, the first and the last points 
of the route cannot be utilized since they are subject to 
an accuracy error, as they are manually selected the user. 
Alternatively, a threshold can be set for every point to be 
acceptable and not to be considered a user error. If that is 
the case, the logical AND operation cannot be performed 
and the coordinates must be used as is. Furthermore, in the 
case of Google maps (and in principle in any third party 
service that is not under a user’s control) changes may occur 
to the coordinates of a point, e.g. they can be altered in order 
to provide better accuracy. 
Encoding the secret with minimum processing allows 
for a large keyspace, easy implementation and it also 
introduces minimum overhead to the client. However, the 
aforementioned solutions have a very strict requirement 
in terms of the precision of the produced secret. A single 
deviation in one digit will result in a change of the route 
password. A threshold for accuracy can also be set in the 
case where no processing takes place.
B. Polynomial Fitting 
The route presented in Fig. 1 can be also represented as 
a set of points in a 2-dimensional projection as depicted in 
Fig. 2, where each turn is presented as a point, independent 
of t the sequence. 
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Figure 2. Route represented as points.
This set of points can be fitted by a polynomial. The 
polynomial can be defined by utilizing the least squares 
approximation and/or variations of it, like the constrained or 
weighted least squares approximation.
1) Least Squares Approximation 
Given a set of data (x1, y1), (x2, y2), … (xn, yn), using 
the least-squares method we can produce an mth  degree 
polynomial y(x) (or a line or a parabola, but we will 
examine the most generic solution) where n>m:
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The best fitting curve y has the least square error, or 
equivalently one wants to minimize the error ∏ ::
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where y is the fitting curve and f(xi) are the actual values 
provided.
The unknown coefficients a0, a1,... , am can be obtained 
by solving the following linear equations:
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The route from Covent Garden to Holborn that serves as 
our example (see Fig. 1) consists of the starting point, the 
ending point and 5 turns. This specific route can be fully 
represented by the information in table I, where each point 
is represented by a set of coordinates (Latitude, Longitude) 
as utilized by Google maps:
In order to address the already mentioned security 
concerns with regards to the entropy of the integer values 
provided, we will discard them. Now the starting point, 
the ending point and the turns of the route have been 
transformed as depicted in Table I
TABLE I. TURNS WITHOUT INTEGER VALUES 
Point X-axis Y-axis
Starting Point 0,51342 -0,123910000000023
Turn 1
0,51383 -0,123190000000022
Turn 2
0,5121 -0,120549999999980
Turn 3
0,51241 -0,119879999999966
Turn 4
0,51205 -0,118969999999990
Turn 5
0,5130 -0,117960000000039
Ending Point 0,5177 -0,120429999999942
 
We will perform the polynomial fitting using the least 
squares approximation to find a polynomial of 4th degree 
that fits the points presented in Table I.  Fig. 3 presents the 
polynomial graphically. The coefficients of the polynomial 
are calculated by solving the set of equations presented 
above in (3):
TABLE II. COEFFICIENTS OF THE 4TH DEGREE POLYNOMIAL WITH 
SEVEN POINTS 
Coefficient Value
α0 -1,98164*107
α1 1,54002*108
α2 -4,48805*108
α3 5,81302*108
α4 -2,82342*108
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Figure 3. Polynomial fitting for all points.
As  mentioned before, the starting and ending points 
are subject to accuracy errors, so if we wish to avoid 
introducing an error acceptance threshold we can instead   
ignore these points and utilize the remaining turning points. 
We will use polynomial fitting to find a polynomial of 4th  
degree that fits the points presented in Table I, excluding 
the starting and ending points. Again, by solving (3) we 
calulate the coefficients of the polynomial (see Table III). 
The polynomial is graphicaly presented in Fig. 4.
TABLE III. COEFFICIENTS OF THE 4TH DEGREE POLYNOMIAL WITH FIVE 
POINTS 
Coefficient Value
α'0 3,61167*109
α'1 -2,81691*1010
α'2 8,238881010
α'3 -1,070981011
α'4 5,220651010
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Figure 4. Polynomial fitting for the turns.
In any case, the generated secret is the function:
( )4)( 44332210 xaxaxaxaaxf ++++=  
For simplicity’s sake, the graphical password could be 
the values of the coefficients themselves. The key space in 
this case would not produced in a straightforward manner, 
since intense mathematical operations would be necessary. 
The produced keyspace will be subject to limitations due 
to the fact that floating point numbers, in a programming 
language, have limited precision We assume that the 
calculations will be performed in a web-based environment 
using JavaScript where numbers are represented using 64 
bits. In that case we would have a keyspace of 5*264 ≈ 1020. 
In the case of Google maps the use of polynomials 
can offer a very significant advantage: in case minor 
modifications in the precision of certain points in the 
map appear, we can set a threshold in the precision of the 
resulting polynomial and, thus, any minor modification 
in the precision will be absorbed. Updating the password 
file with every possible modification besides being a 
cumbersome task may result in introducing vulnerabilities 
that can be exploited by attackers. If T is the threshold 
value, then a user that is challenged with x1 in order to 
authenticate himself should return a value in the range 
A’=f(x1) ±T, resulting ina reduced keyspace of  264/(2*T).
 
2) Least Square Approximation with Weights and 
Constraints
The starting and ending points of the route are not only 
subject to accuracy errors when the user is selecting them, 
but changes may also occur to the rest of the turns due to 
changes introduced by the provider of the map service. So 
far, in order to cope with this issue we ignored these facts to 
retain the generated password accuracy. In the polynomial 
encoding approach, we can utilize the Least Square 
Approximation with weights. Then, Equation (1) becomes:
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 where wi>0 are positive weights that allow placing more 
emphasis on reliable data points and less on the others by 
choosing for them larger and smaller values respectively. In 
the least square approximation with constraints, constraints 
can be imposed, for example, to require that at certain points 
the error will be zero or an acceptable threshold of deviation 
can be set.
V. SECURITY PERFORMANCE 
A. Brute force and Dictionary Attacks
The keyspace is defined as the set of different possible 
values of a key. A password with n characters, where 
each of those characters can have c different values will 
have a keyspace size  k = cn. A large keyspace provides 
assurance against brute force attacks, where the attacker is 
exhaustively trying all possible values of the password to 
be cracked. However, a large keyspace does not guarantee 
the security of an authentication scheme. It is often the case 
where an attacker instead of trying to check by brute force 
the entire keyspace will select sub-keyspaces that fulfill 
certain criteria that render them as a more likely selection by 
users. This is often called a dictionary attack. 
For example, if we take a five digit password consisting 
of upper and/or lower case letters from the English alphabet 
the keyspace size S is 52*52*52*52*52≈4*108. If the 
password is generated truly randomly and an attacker 
has launched a brute force attack he would have 1/
4*108  chances that any single guess would match a given 
password. 
However, if a user chooses his own password he would 
choose an easy-to-remember password rather than a random 
one. Let us assume that the user chooses a word from the 
English language. The exact number of the English words is 
nearly impossible to define accurately, and it is equally hard 
to estimate the words a human individual can remember. 
However, it is hard to argue that a human will be capable of 
memorizing and using more than 200.000 words, even in an 
over-optimistic scenario where the end user is a genius. In 
this case the attackers will have a 1/200.000 chance that any 
single guess would match the given password. An attacker 
that has some additional information of his target can launch 
a more targeted guessing attack that will consist of words 
like the target’s name, maiden name, city of birth, country, 
city and address of residence etc. 
The subset of English words is a subset of the entire 
password keyspace. Any subset of the password keyspace 
S that allows an attacker to guess passwords with less 
effort is called a Weak Key Sub-space, WS, where WS  ⊆
S. Dictionary attacks are based upon weak password 
subspaces. Essentially, a dictionary is a Weak Key 
subspace, like the set of English words mentioned before. 
In another real-life example, for a network router a weak 
subspace consists of the default passwords as initialized by 
the related vendor.
 
 
Figure 5. Password keyspace and weak key sub-spaces.
The most important feature of a dictionary is its size. We 
must also take into account the effort required to create a 
dictionary. It is often the case where the cost of generating 
a dictionary is ignored altogether since in most cases one 
precomputation is adequate to create a dictionary and that 
cost is considered negligible. However, in some cases the 
precomputation of dictionaries is not feasible, e.g. if the 
pictures to appear are not anticipated, then a dictionary 
has to be created on the fly. In such cases, the cost of 
generating a dictionary may be as important as the size of 
the dictionary [22].
 
B. Text Passwords vs. Graphical Passwords
Text passwords have been exhaustively analyzed and 
attacked as they are the dominant user authentication 
method used. On the contrary, limited research has taken 
place towards attacking and cracking graphical passwords 
since they have not been used for such a long period and 
they have not yet been widely adopted. Nevertheless, 
graphical password schemes appear to suffer from problems 
similar to text passwords, like dictionary attacks.
The following criteria will be used in order to examine 
and evaluate the proposed solution against text-based 
passwords and other graphical password schemes.
• Security
o Brute force attacks
o Dictionary attacks (guessing attacks  and 
statistical attacks)
o Spyware and keyloggers
•  Non technical hacking
o Social engineering
o Shoulder surfing
In order to effectively counter brute force attacks a large 
password keyspace is required. As we have shown, NAVI 
enables the selection of passwords with an efficiently large 
keyspace. Recognition-based schemes offer a limited key 
space, rendering them vulnerable to brute force attacks. In 
order to increase the key space the number of pictures can 
be increased and/or the user be challenged several times. 
Apparently, such an approach will be time-consuming, 
tiresome and also hard to remember. 
Countering dictionary attacks is neither easy nor 
straightforward, as it depends to a large extent on the end 
user. Dictionary attacks have proven to be very effective 
against text-based passwords [1], and a series of automated 
tools are available for that purpose, e.g. brutus, and John 
the Ripper. Graphical passwords have the advantage 
that they are harder, although by no means impossible to 
launch automated attacks against them. Although graphical 
passwords have not been exhaustively attacked and 
investigated, significant work towards realizing effective 
attacks has been illustrated. Dictionary attacks can also 
be launched against graphical passwords, since the idea 
that some sets of graphical passwords are more likely 
to be chosen than others is applicable in essentially any 
knowledge-based scheme. These sets naturally define a 
weak key subspace and the related graphical dictionary. 
Such automated attacks have been demonstrated to be 
effective against PassPoints in Dirik et al. [11], Thorpe et al. 
[12] and Oorschot et al. [22].
We argue that NAVI has an increased resistance 
to dictionary attacks due to the unpredictability of 
the “picture” the user selects. Launching a dictionary 
attack on NAVI will require significant effort, since the 
picture/map to be attacked is unknown to the attacker. If 
the location of the map was known, then places of interest, 
crossroads etc, would be identified and used to formulate 
a dictionary. However, this assumes that the attacker has 
knowledge of the area the user has selected, which must be 
acquired through other means, such as social engineering. 
The attacker cannot be aware of which part of the map a 
user will use but he can only make an educated guess of 
a larger area in case he has some additional information 
regarding the user. Nevertheless, even in the case we 
assume that dictionary attacks are feasible against NAVI, 
the attacker will also have to be able to handle the overhead 
of creating the dictionary in real time, prior to launching his 
attack. Even in that case, the attacker should not only guess 
the starting and ending points but also the deviation from 
the default route. This renders the creation of dictionaries 
a cumbersome task, since they must be created on the fly 
imposing a significant overhead on the attacker.
Guessing attacks can be seen as a more targeted sub-
category of the dictionary attacks. An effective and provable 
defense against such attacks is nearly impossible, since the 
selection of passwords ultimately relies on the end users, 
and the attempts to “force” users into choosing secure 
passwords produce questionable results. Recall-based 
schemes have the advantage of rendering such attacks more 
cumbersome for the malicious user since the attacker will 
have to create his dictionary on demand.
Spyware/key loggers have the ability to log the 
keystrokes and hence the input of a text-based password. 
More advanced spyware has also the ability to take 
screenshots that can compromise graphical passwords too. 
In case of text-based password end-point security, e.g. 
antivirus, spyware detection software, appears as the only 
solution. Graphical passwords even though not immune to 
such attacks are more resistant due to their very nature. 
When it comes to shoulder surfing, the nature of 
graphical passwords is a handicap, and apparently they are 
more vulnerable to such attacks. In the following section we 
suggest a solution that mitigates the risk of shoulder surfing 
for NAVI by utilizing opacity and, thus, limiting the range 
at which a shoulder surfing attack can be successful.
Social engineering requires little or no technical skills 
and similarly to guessing attacks, a defense against such 
attacks mainly relies on the user, making it   hard, if not 
impossible, to defend by implementing solely technical 
countermeasures.
In Table IV, we summarize the conclusions of the above 
discussion with our estimation of the NAVI performance 
against the attacks aforementioned.
TABLE IV. SUMMARY OF NAVI SECURITY FEATURES 
Attack 
method Security element NAVI performance
Brute force Password keyspace ■■■■■ (Very High)
Dictionary Weak Password 
keyspaces
■■■■■ 
(Very High)
Guessing Recall or recognition 
capabilities of end users
■■■□□
 (Medium)
Spyware End point security / Data 
input method
■■■■□ 
(High)
Shoulder 
surfing
Data input method ■□□□□ 
(Very Low)
Social 
engineering
Credentials  type ■■■□□ 
(Medium)
 
Furthermore, following the security discussion, in Table 
V we summarize the comparison of NAVI with graphical-
based password schemes (recognition and recall-based) and 
text-based passwords.
TABLE V. PASSWORDS SCHEMES COMPARISON 
Attack 
method NAVI
Recognition 
based
Recall 
based
Text 
based
Brute force ■■■■■ ■□□□□ ■■■■□  ■■■□□
Dictionary ■■■■■ ■□□□□ ■■■■□  ■■□□□
Guessing ■■■□□ ■■□□□ ■■■□□ ■■□□□
Spyware ■■■■□ ■■■■□ ■■■■□ ■■□□□
Shoulder 
surfing
■■□□□ ■■□□□ ■■□□□ ■■■■□
Social 
engineering
■■■□□ ■■■□□ ■■■□□ ■■■□□
 
C. Countering Shoulder Surfing
The security analysis illustrated that the proposed 
scheme has the same or better performance compared to 
text-based passwords and graphical password schemes, with 
the exception of shoulder surfing attacks. In the following 
section we discuss techniques to enhance the resistance of 
NAVI to such attacks. We have identified the following 
possible solutions:
• Opacity is the extent to which something blocks 
light. By covering the map with the route, for 
example, with a blue picture with opacity of 50%, 
the route will be behind a “blue certain” thus visible 
to the user that is close to the screen but not visible 
to an interceptor a few meters away. For more 
details see the next section.
• Multiple Routes. Have a pool of routes created by 
users; each time the user will be challenged with a 
different one chosen randomly.
• Partial use of route Instead of creating the full 
route the user selects, for example,4 points, which 
are verified to belong to the route to formulate the 
password. The shoulder surfing attack still provides 
information to the attacker since he limits his attack 
paths in the context of a specific area that he has 
observed. When the user selects/clicks on a point on 
the route, this point may not appear on the screen. 
In the latter case there is an obvious reduction in the 
password keyspace.
VI. PROOF OF CONCEPT
In order to illustrate the feasibility of the proposed 
scheme a prototype has been implemented. JavaScript 
and the Google maps API have been used for the 
implementation. In addition to the elements already 
discussed the implementation offers the following features.
In order to add further complexity the end user can 
select whether his route will be calculated for driving or 
walking, hence although the starting and ending points 
maybe the same, the route will be altered. Similarly, the 
user is offered the choice of a calculated route that avoids 
highways and/or tolls. Finally, the user is forced to define 
one more point that the route has to pass through (see Fig. 
6). Furthermore, in Fig. 8, the use of opacity in order to 
counter shoulder surfing attacks is presented.  
 
 
Figure 6. Planning the route password.
 
 
Figure 7. Google map with opacity.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented NAVI, a novel graphical password 
scheme where the credentials of the user are a route 
designed on a predetermined map. We believe that NAVI 
is the first model to combine strong graphical passwords 
along with ease-of-use. However, the strong security 
features remain to be more strictly proven. Future work 
involves examining the usability of the scheme through 
the deployment of the system and its usage by a number 
of users. The proof of concept presented illustrated 
the feasibility of implementation and the possibility of 
deployment of the proposed scheme in web applications 
without the need to significantly modify the underlying 
applications. The user testing will provide valuable 
feedback with regards to the usability and viability of the 
authentication system and will try to answer the following 
key questions: Is it easy to use (Login time)? Is it easy to 
memorize the routes? Is it easy to learn and accept the use 
of the system?
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